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Abstract 
Design and Implementation of an Online Anonymous Feedback System 
Saad Inshi 
Society has long seen anonymity in many forms such as suggestion boxes, 
unsigned letters and blocked calls. In the online world, the protection of users' 
anonymity, when performing some online transactions, is an important factor in the 
acceptance and use of several Internet and web services. Solutions for minimizing release 
of personal information can be based on many proposed cryptographic techniques for 
providing anonymity. 
In this thesis, we describe the design and implementation of an online feedback 
system employing an anonymous authentication mechanism based on blind RSA 
signature scheme. The proposed system prevents malicious evaluators from assuming 
multiple identities. It also maintains the anonymity of the evaluator even against an 
abusive authority that has access to the evaluation servers. Based on our design, the 
authority, responsible for the evaluation process, can be held accountable if it blocks any 
user's feedback. The system also prevents malicious evaluators from sending multiple 
evaluations for the same evaluatee. Finally, the developed system is generic enough, user 
friendly and allows the administrator to change the evaluation form to fit the assessment 
of essentially any type of function or performance. 
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Different forms of anonymity, such as suggestion boxes, unsigned letters and 
blocked phone calls, have been observed by society for many years. Privacy and 
anonymity are similar entangled concerns; with anonymity often helping individuals 
better maintain their privacy1. For example, a person making an anonymous health query 
is better assured of her privacy than if she had to rely, for her privacy, on the discretion of 
those answering her query. In other scenarios, anonymity may even assume a more 
important role; it is not hard to imagine how whistle-blowers may suffer in many ways, 
often destroying their career if they lose their anonymity. 
Traditional anonymity is prone to technical challenges that might reveal the 
anonymous source. It is not hard to envision situations where the source of anonymous 
One can also argue otherwise; anonymity may encourage some people to be 
careless about revealing other people's private information without the fear of being 
traced or being held accountable. In this thesis, we focus only on some technical aspects 
related to anonymity. In other words, we will not concern ourselves with the everlasting 
debate for or against anonymity. 
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paper form is revealed using simple fingerprinting techniques. These challenges for 
anonymity become even greater in the online world where, despite some local increase, 
there is a dramatic global loss in anonymity. 
It is clear that there are a number of aspects to anonymity that must be measured 
in the anonymous systems. The following types are defined in [23]: 
• Author-anonymity. In such a system, an author cannot be linked to a document 
that she has created. 
• Publisher-anonymity. In such a system, a publisher cannot be linked to a 
document that she has made available to the network. 
• Reader-anonymity. In such a system, a user cannot be linked to a request that 
she has made for a document. 
• Server-anonymity. In such a system, a server cannot be linked to documents that 
it is storing. 
• Document-anonymity. In such a system, a server cannot decide which 
documents it is storing at this time. This property also implies that there is no 
information to be gained about stored documents by an attacker that manages to 
compromise the server. A negative effect of this type of anonymity is that servers 
are unable to perform advanced matching of stored documents against queries. 
For example, a free-text search on document titles is impossible as the titles of 
stored documents are unknown. 
• Query-anonymity. In such a system, a server cannot determine which document 
it is serving when satisfying a request. 
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Because of its multidisciplinary nature, studying different aspects of anonymity 
has attracted researchers from different fields such as social sciences, law, and 
engineering. From engineering perspective, cryptographic tools have a lot to offer when 
it comes to improving privacy and anonymity. As mentioned before, in this thesis, we 
focus only on the technical aspects of online anonymous feedback systems. 
These feedback systems are widely being used in commercial as well as 
noncommercial contexts. In such systems, anonymity would encourage more 
participation and if implemented carefully would arguably, also encourage trustworthy 
behavior, and deter dishonest participants. To further explain this, one should note that in 
a non-anonymous online feedback system, rater identity is fully known and hence raters 
are likely to be targets of retaliation in case of negative reporting, especially when 
feedback information is in the form of qualitative reviews, which contain statements that 
may be considered as libel. On the other hand, fully anonymous online feedback 
systems, at the other extreme, make it easier for sources to report without fear of 
retaliation. However, we have to concede that with this property, we may facilitate 
irresponsible, manipulative reporting and collusion [30] and hence one may also consider 
systems where the user anonymity can be revoked (for accountability) when the user 
violate a pre-specified set of rules. 
Many Online feedback (rating) systems are already being used in many online 
commercial applications, such as eBay (http://www.ebay.com), Amazon 
(http://www.amazon.com), ePinions (http://www.epinions.com) and Bizrate 
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(http://www.bitrate.com). The eBay system allows bidders to check the previous history 
of a particular seller. Following each transaction, eBay encourages both participants to 
give feedback about their partner, which consists of +1,0,-1 for positive, natural and 
negative, followed by a text comment. The feedback score is displayed as a part of 
feedback profile. This feedback can assist other parties in deciding whether or not to 
transact with that party in the future. Similarly, Amazon allows users to rate others on a 
l-to-5 scale with some set of properties such as fairness and product quality. Then the 
system will attach the result to the user's identity. ePinions' rating system is almost 
identical to the Amazon system with a text comment. Also users can be rated as "not 
helpful", "somewhat helpful", "helpful", or "very helpful". Bizrate allows users to rate 
prices, selections, site navigation, shopping options, and their satisfaction with shopping 
experiences. The merchant will be granted a customer certification if and only if it gets a 
sufficient number of positive ratings over a period of time. For the above applications, 
the use of pseudonyms might be enough to palliate source shyness. However, 
pseudonyms must be stable over time: if a source constantly changes pseudonyms, it is 
even worse than anonymity in the sense that it is a potential indication of untruthful 
reporting. 
In this thesis, we are more concerned with applications where the users 
submitting the feedback belong to a predetermined population of much smaller size 
compared to the above Internet rating systems. One familiar application is the online 
course evaluation (questionnaire) at Concordia University which requires students, 
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registered to a given course, to provide selected response answers to a series of questions 
in order to anonymously evaluate the instructor teaching effectiveness in this course. 
1.1 Traditional vs. Online Feedback Systems 
Traditional feedback requires users to fill out at least one paper to rate a user, 
instructor, course or product. For example, some universities are using printed forms, 
which are typically filled by hand at the end of every semester. These forms might very 
tedious to complete during class time; also, results are delivered weeks after the 
evaluation. 
Online feedback systems are capable of accomplishing the same task as 
traditional evaluations and would be easier and more cost-effective to users. These 
systems are immediate and flexible. They may also allow users to review real-time results 
presented in various formats. Digitally stored data could also be readily used for analysis 
and establishing historical trends. Finally, the users have the opportunity to complete the 
evaluation on their own time. 
These features make online feedback systems more convenient for all users. On 
the other hand, online users would typically be more concerned about their privacy and 
anonymity because of the necessary login methods. These concerns will not be alleviated 
unless these online systems guaranteed that evaluators' identities could not be traced 
back. 
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1.2 Motivation of the Research 
There are several difficulties and challenges facing online feedback systems. 
One that often mentioned is the fact that most implementations for online feedback 
systems do not ensure the user's anonymity. For example, in most of the electronic 
course evaluation systems presently implemented by several universities, an abusive 
authority, which has access to the evaluation server log files, can easily link each student 
with her evaluation. While this is unlikely to happen in the academic environment where 
ethics and morals are highly valued, one can easily imagine several other scenarios where 
this may not be the case. This lack of trust in achieving true anonymity and the fear of a 
retaliatory response may prevent evaluators from casting their true opinions and hence 
limits the effectives of the overall evaluation process. 
On the other hand, allowing uncontrolled anonymous feedback (e.g., 
RateMyProfessor.com) opens the door to Sybil attacks where a malicious user may 
subvert the system by creating a large number of pseudonymous entities, and use them to 
gain a disproportionately large influence. 
It should also be noted that, in some situations, the authority overseeing the 
evaluation process may not always be unbiased. For example, a large number of negative 
ratings for buyers or sellers on a given virtual market website (e.g., eBay) will certainly 
reduce the total number of transactions and consequently the profit gained by this 
website. Thus, a dishonest company may try to block some negative feedbacks in order to 
optimize its profit; at least in the short term. 
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In this thesis, we present an implementation for a web-based feedback system 
using RSA blind signature scheme [10]. The proposed system is generic enough, user 
friendly and allows the administrator to change the evaluation form to fit the assessment 
of any type of function or performance. In particular, by employing an anonymous 
authentication mechanism, the developed system ensures that: 
(i) The evaluator's anonymity is protected even against an abusive passive authority 
that has access to the evaluator server (we assume that this authority can read log 
files but cannot change the software running on this server), 
(ii) Every registered user is allowed to cast her vote only once, 
(iii) By issuing evaluation receipts, the authority responsible for the evaluation 
process can be held accountable if it blocks any user's feedback. 
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1.3 Thesis Overview 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. 
O In Chapter 2, we review some of the available cryptographic primitives for 
providing anonymous online feedback systems and their security 
requirements. We also present a comparison of these primitives based on 
general security properties. 
O In Chapter 3, we present essential assumptions and the design of the 
developed online anonymous feedback system. 
O In Chapter 4, we describe the implementation; provide some security analysis 
and the countermeasures of various attacks on our system. 




Cryptographic Primitives for 
Supporting Anonymity 
2.1 Introduction 
Cryptographic protocols [14] provide several invaluable primitives that can be 
used to design systems with stringent anonymity, also known as unlinkability, 
requirements (e.g., e-voting [2, 9, 11, 40], e-cash [2, 6, 7, 8, 1], and electronic coupons 
[22]). 
In this chapter, we review some of these cryptographic primitives for supporting 
anonymous online feedback systems and their security requirements. For completeness, 
we start this chapter with a brief review of some public key preliminaries. 
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2.2 Preliminaries 
2.2.1 Public Key Cryptosystem and Digital Signature 
Public-key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, was 
first introduced by Diffie and Hellman [6] in 1976. The main idea of this technique is that 
a user can have a pair of cryptographic keys: a public key, which can be widely 
distributed, and a private key, which is kept secret. To ensure confidentiality, when the 
message encrypted by recipient's public key, no one else can decrypt the message 
without knowing the recipient's private key. A public key cryptosystem can also be used 
for digital signature [7]. A digital signature scheme can be used to ensure authenticity by 
establishing that the message must have been signed by the sender's private key. Then it 
can be verified by anyone who has access to the sender's public key. 
Thus a digital signature of a message can be seen as a block of data dependent 
on some secret known only to the signer, and, additionally, on the content of the message 
being signed. A digital signature is verifiable; if a dispute arises as to whether Alice 
signed a message, an unbiased third party should be able to resolve the matter equitably, 
without requiring access to Alice's secret information. Typically, a digital signature 
scheme consists of a signature generation algorithm and an associated verification 
algorithm. A digital signature generation algorithm is a method for a signer to produce a 
digital signature on a particular message. A digital signature verification algorithm is a 
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method for verifying that a digital signature is authentic, (i.e., was indeed created by the 
specified signer). 
A digital signature generation algorithm (the signing process) must use some 
secret information that is only accessible to the signer. A digital signature verification 
algorithm, in contrast, uses some public information about the signer to verify the 
signature. Some public-key cryptography algorithms, among other mechanisms, can be 
deployed as digital signature schemes: the signer signs a message with her private key, 
while anyone else may verify the signature using the public key of the signer. It should be 
noted that with some public-key cryptography algorithms such as RSA, signing a 
message is actually employing the encryption algorithm on the message with the signer's 
private key, and verifying a signature is actually employing the decryption algorithm on 
the signature with the signer's public key. But this is not always the case for all public-
key systems. The following discussions on digital signature mechanisms are based on 
public-key cryptography algorithms that are similar to the RSA algorithm. 
Suppose Alice wants to send a signed message m to Bob. Generally the first 
step is applying a one-way hash function K to the message to create the message digest. 
h = 3i(m) 
To create a digital signature S, the signing process usually signs the message 
digest h instead of the message itself. In this way, it saves a considerable amount of time, 
because a message digest is shorter compared to the message itself. 
Next, by encrypting the message digest h with her private keyft^ c e , Alice 
actually creates a digital signature S on h with a secret of herself: 
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S = Sing(h,KAl}ce) 
Alice sends Bob the signature S together with the message. In order for Bob to 
verify the signature, he must first apply the same hash function "K as Alice did to the 
message m she sent him: 
ht = K(m) 
Then he verifies Alice's signature S using her public key: 
Verify(S,KAUceM 
The verification process above is actually accomplished in two steps. First, it 
decrypts S with Alice's public key KAUce to get a value h2. Second, it compares h-i and 
h2: if they are the same, it means that the signature is successfully verified; otherwise, the 
verification fails, which may suggest that either someone is trying to impersonate Alice, 
or the message itself has been altered since Alice signed it, or an error occurred during 
the transmission. 
2.2.2 RSA Algorithm 
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [8] introduced the RSA system, which is 
considered to be the first algorithm, in the public literature, suitable for both signing as 
well as encryption. The RSA security is based on the difficulty of factoring large 
numbers. The RSA algorithm can be described as following. 
(i) Key generation. To generate the public and the private key pairs, Alice chooses 
two large prime numbers p and q, and computes their product n = p.q. Then, 
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Alice randomly chooses a number e smaller than n, such that e and <P(ri) are 
relatively prime, where <P(n) = (p — l )(g — 1). After that Alice computes d 
such that e. d = l(mode <P(ri)). Then (n, e) are announced as public key of 
Alice and d is kept secret as Alice's private key. 
(ii) Encryption. Having access to Alice's public key, Bob is now able to send an 
encrypted message m to Alice. Bob uses Alice's public key to computes c = 
memod n, where c is the encrypted message, 
(iii) Decryption. Alice uses her private key to compute m = cd mod n, where m is 
the original message. 
2.2.3 Commitment Schemes 
In cryptographic protocols making a commitment simply means that a player in 
a protocol is able to choose a value from some finite set and commit to her choice such 
that she can no longer change her mind. She does not however, have to reveal her choice, 
although she may choose to reveal it at some later time [33]. 
As an informal example, consider the following game between two players, Alice 
and Bob. 
(i) Alice wants to commit to a bit b. To do so, she writes down b on a piece of paper, 
puts it in a box, and locks it using a padlock, 
(ii) Alice gives the box to Bob. 
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(iii) Later on, if Alice wants to open her commitment, she can do so by giving Bob 
the key of the padlock. 
There are three basic requirements, which are essential to any commitment scheme: 
(i) Having given away the box, Alice cannot anymore change what is inside. Hence, 
when the box is opened, we know that what is revealed was the choice that Alice 
committed. This is usually called the binding property, 
(ii) When Bob receives the box, he cannot tell what is inside before Alice decides to 
give the key. This is usually called the hiding property, 
(iii) If both Alice and Bob follow the protocol, Bob will always recover the 
committed value. This is usually called the validity. 
2.3 Cryptographic Primitives for supporting anonymity 
In this section we list several cryptographic primitives that were designed to 
achieve some anonymity and accountability objectives. 
2.3.1 Blind Signature Schemes 
A blind signature is the equivalent of signing carbon paper lined envelopes. 
Writing a signature on the outside of such envelope leaves a carbon copy of the signature 
on a slip of paper within the envelope. When the envelope is opened, the slip will show 
the carbon image of the signature. The concept of blind signatures was introduced by 
Chaum [10] as a method to digitally authenticate and sign a message without knowing the 
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content of the message. The resulting signature can be publicly verified against the 
original unblinded message in the same manner of a regular digital signature. Blind 
signatures are typically employed in privacy-related protocols, such as digital cash and 
electronic voting, where the signer and message author are different parties. 
Blind signature schemes must satisfy the following requirements: 
(i) Anonymity: also known as unlinkability, which prevents the signer from linking 
later the blinded message to unblinded version that it may be called upon to 
verify. In this case, the signer's response is first unblinded prior to verification in 
such a way that the signature remains valid for the unblinded message. This 
property makes blind signature useful in schemes where anonymity is required, 
(ii) Verifiability: The receiver of the signature should be able to verify the stripped 
signature was formed using signer's private key. 
Blind RSA Signature Procedures 
Blind signature schemes can be implemented using a number of common 
public key signing schemes. In what follows, we describe the RSA blind signature 
scheme. Suppose Bob wants Alice to sign a message m without knowing the content 
of m, then they have to follow these protocol steps: 
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(i) Bob randomly selects a random blinding factor k and makes a blinding 
transformation on m to get the blinded message as: 
rh = m.kemodn 
where (n, e) are the public signing key of Alice, 
(ii) Bob sends rh to Alice. Note that Alice will not be able to recover m from rh 
because she does not know the blinding factor k. 
(iii) Alice signs rh using her private key to produce 
5 = rhd = (m. ke)d = k. md mod n 
and then returns 5 to Bob. 
To obtain Alice's signature on m, Bob computes 
S = S. k~x = md mod n 
Note that asking Alice to sign a one way function of m (say H(m)) will not satisfy 
the unlinkability requirement above after m is revealed. 
2.3.2 Group Signature Scheme 
In 1991, Chaum and van Heyst proposed the concept of a group signature 
scheme [20], which allows a group member to anonymously sign a message on behalf of 
the group. The most significant part of this scheme is that the signatures can be verified 
with a single public key of the group without revealing the identity of the signer. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to decide whether two signatures have been issued by the 
same group member. The Group Manager (GM) is the only one that can add a group 
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member to the system while the revocation manager is responsible for revoking the 
anonymity of signatures. 
More precisely, associated to the group there is a single signature-verification 
key called the group public key, and each group member has its own secret signing key 
that can produce signature relative to the group public key. The GM has a secret key 
based in which it can extract the identity of any malicious group member. 
Various group signature schemes [16, 20, 24, 32, 34, 35] have been proposed so 
far. All of them should satisfy these basic requirements: 
(i) Anonymity: The identity of any group member cannot be revealed without 
the help of the GM. 
(ii) Soundness and completeness: The verification of the correct group 
member's signature must be always accepted. On the other hand, invalid 
signatures must always fail the verification step, 
(iii) Unlinkability: It is not possible to decide whether two signatures have been 
issued by the same group member, 
(iv) Unforgeability: Only group members are able to make valid signatures, 
(v) Unforgeable Traceability: GM cannot accuse a group member of creating a 
signature which she has not created. 
(vi)Colluding Resistance: Even if all group members, including the GM, collude 
with each other, they should not be able to forge a signature for a non-
participating group member. 
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The major distinct feature of group signature scheme is that the GM has the 
ability to reveal and trace any group member even if there is no dispute. In some 
applications, this feature helps improve accountability, while in other applications it can 
present a real threat to user's anonymity. 
In what follows, we present some details of a typical group signature scheme 
[24]. 
Group Signature Procedures 
The group signature scheme described in [24] consists of the following five procedures: 
setup, join, sign, verify and open. 
Setup: 
Given a security parameter K, GM generates a secure K-bit RSA modulus n = pq 
and d,e E 7L^ such thatde = 1 {mod <p(ri)). An Online Trusted Third Party (OTTP) 
also generates a K-bit RSA modulus N = PQ, where N < n and D, E E"E*N such 
that DE = 1 (mod(p(N)). 
The group public keys are (e, ri) and (E, N), while d and D are kept secret by the GM 




Suppose that ut wants to join the group and that the communication among the 
evaluators, OTTP and GM is secure. The GM chooses a random number r from Z^ and 
computes dt = d — r (mod (p(n)). Then r is sent to ut and (d^m) is sent to OTTP. After 
this action, ut becomes a group member and her group membership secret key is r. 
Sign: 
To generate a group signature on a message m, ut collaborates with OTTP to do 
the following: 
(i) ut sends Ji(e\\E,m) along with her identity to OTTP. 
(ii) OTTP first checks thatUj's membership has not been revoked. It then stores 
(uuW{e\\E,M))waA computes St = H(e\\E,M)D(mod N) and Sigt = 
St l(mod ri). (Si, Sigi) is sent back to ut. 
(iii) After receiving (S^ Sigt), ut checks that H(e\\E,M) = Sf* ( mod N) holds. She 
then computes Sig[ = S[(mod ri). The group signature on message m is set to 
beer = Sigt.Sigl (modn). 
Verify: 
Having received the group signature a on message m, the verifier 
computes S = ae ( mod n). She accepts the group signature if 
M(e\\E,M)= SE (modN). 
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Open: 
In the case of a dispute, the GM has to open some group signatures on some 
messages. Suppose that she wants to open a group signature o on some message m. She 
only needs to send an enquiry to OTTP. OTTP consults the storage list and sends the 
original signer Wj back to GM. 
2.3.3 Ring Signature Schemes 
In 2001, Rivest, Shamir and Tauman introduced the concept of ring signatures 
[21], which can be considered as a simplified group signature without group manager. A 
valid ring signature will convince the verifier that this signature has been generated by 
one of the ring members without revealing any information that will link to the actual 
signer. 
One of the most significant security properties in ring signature schemes is that it 
is difficult to determine which of the group members' key was used in producing the 
signature. Consequently, there is no way to revoke the identity of individual signer, even 
if there is a dispute. In other words, ring signature can provide full anonymity, but fail to 
ensure accountability. 
This scheme must satisfy the following requirements: 
(i) Anonymity: A verifier is able to authenticate the validity of the signature, but is 
unable to identify the signer. 
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(ii) Unforgeability : The signature could neither be forged by the verifier, nor be 
generated by a non-member, 
(iii) Confidentiality: Message m is sent in ciphertext form so that it can only be 
decrypted by those with a secret session key. 
In what follows, we describe a typical ring signature scheme [21]. 
Ring Signature Procedures 
The formal description of the ring signature scheme [21] is as follows: 
Ring Signature Generation 
Let Pt, P2,..., Pr be the sequence of public keys of all the ring members, where Pt 
is an RSA public key and Pi = (n;, e{) for i = 1,2, ...,r. Also, each ring member has a 
secret key ds, where s 6 {1,2,..., r}. 
Given a message m to be signed, the signer computes a ring signature as follows, 
(i) Determine the symmetric key: The signer first computes the symmetric key k 
as the hash of the message m to be signed 
k = H(m) 
(ii) Pick a random glue value: The signer picks an initialization value v uniformly 
at random from {0,1}& where b is a large number. 
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(iii) Pick random Xj's: The signer picks random xt for all the other ring 
members 1 < i < r, wherei =£ s, and computes^ = gi{xt), where g is a 
trapdoor permutation function. 
(iv) Solve for ys: Let CkiV(y1,y2, — ,yr) be a family of keyed combining 
functions, which take as input a key k, an initialization value v, and arbitrary 
values yx,y2,..., yr. The signer solves the following ring equation for ys: 
Ck.viyi.yz,-,yr) - v 
By assumption, given arbitrary values for the other inputs, there is a unique 
value for ys satisfying the equation, which can be computed efficiently. 
(v) Invert the signer's trapdoor permutation: The signer uses her knowledge of her 
trapdoor in order to invert gs on , ys to obtain xs: 
xs = g71(ys) 
(vi) Output the ring signature: The signature on the message m is defined to be 
the (2r + l)-tuple: 
(* 1J* 2> ••• >Pr> V>xlix2> ••• iXr) 
Ring Signature Verification 
A verifier can verify an alleged signature (Plt P2l —,Pr', v;x1,x2, ...,xr) on the 
message m as follows. 
(i) Apply the trapdoor permutations: For i = 1,2,..., r the verifier computes 
yi = gt(.Xi) 
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(ii) Obtain Vc: The verifier hashes the message to compute the symmetric encryption 
key k: 
k = H(m) 
(iii) Verify the ring equation: The verifier checks that the y^'s satisfy the fundamental 
equation: 
Ck,v(yi.y2.-.yr) = v 
If this ring equation is satisfied, the verifier accepts the signature as valid. Otherwise 
the verifier rejects. 
2.3.4 List Signature Schemes 
List signature schemes [26] are variants of group signatures which set a limit on 
the number of signatures each group member may issue. These limits must be enforced 
without having the group manager (GM) open signatures of honest group members to see 
whether some group members exceed their limited number of the signatures. However, 
this scheme has the ability to trace dishonest members without the intervention of the 
GM. 
List signature schemes satisfy the following requirements [26]: 
(i) Anonymity: Given a set of signatures over different time frames, the adversary 
cannot determine whether two of them were produced by the same group 
member. 
23 
(ii) Correctness: Firstly, an adversary cannot prevent honest group members from 
producing valid signatures; also, an adversary cannot cause the detection of the 
signatures of an honest group member. 
(iii) Soundness: An adversary can produce at most one valid signature per time frame 
per corrupted player without being detected, or without the identity of a corrupted 
group member being released. Note that signatures obtained from querying honest 
signers do not count as produced by the adversary. Also if applicable, an 
adversary cannot produce a valid signature that does not open to a corrupted 
player. 
In here, we describe the list signature scheme proposed in [26]. 
List Signature Procedures 
Setup 
The GM picks a group Gq of prime order q and publishes (Gq, q), together with 
two randomly chosen generators g and hofGq. The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem is 
assumed to be hard in the group Gq. Further, cryptographic hash functions !H : {0,1}* -» 
Gq and K' : {0,1}* -» TLq are defined. 
24 
Join 
A user ut joins by picking a random x G %q and publishing P = gx, together with a non-
interactive proof of knowledge ofx. Henceforth we assume that ut is legally bound to its 
public key P; and we set xt = logg P;. 
S/gn 
Let (P1;...,PN) be a group public key and let i G {!,...,N}. User Uj wishing to 
sign a message m in time frame 7 first computes t = H(T), s = K(T,1) andX = 
H'(m,T). The values 7\ = t*; and T2 = sXiPiX are published together with a non-
interactive proof of knowledge that for some i G {1, . . . , N} it holds that the user knows 
an x E ZgSuch that Pt = gx, Tx = tx, and T2 = (sgx)x without revealing x nor i. 
Verify 
Verify that the public key is correct, i.e., it only consists of values resulting from 
the Join protocol, and verify the non-interactive proof included in the signature. 
Match 
If two signatures (Tlt T2) on message m and (T[ , T2) on message m' based on the 
same time frame T satisfy Tt = T[ compute 
P = (T2/Ti ^/C*-*') 
where X = K'(m,T) and X' = H'(m',T). Identify the double-signer as ut with 
P = Pt. 
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2.3.5 Electronic Coupons 
In this section, we show how electronic coupons can be used to provide user's 
anonymity. While originally proposed for e-commerce applications, electronic coupons 
can also be used in the design of anonymous feedback systems. 
Similar to group signature schemes, the electronic coupons system described in 
[22] allows the GM to trace users. 
Electronic coupons scheme must satisfy the following requirements: 
(i) Anonymity: No one except the GM can reveal the identity of the user, 
(ii) Unreliability: The user can be identified if she submitted same feedback more 
than once, 
(iii) Unforgeability: This means that the feedback cannot be forged. 
Electronic Coupon Procedures 
The formal description of the electronic coupon scheme in [22] is as follows: 
Setup 
Assume that a ticket is divided into k sub-tickets, each sub-ticket is assigned to 
the index i (1 < i < k), and all participants agree on the type of ticket, that is, the face 
values of the ticket and the sub-tickets, and the indices in advance. If different types of 
tickets are used, the GM and user must execute the following step to make secret and 
public keys for each type of ticket. Thus, a public key is assigned to a type of ticket. 
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(i) GM computes the following: 
• An RSA modulus n and two public exponents elt e2 > 1. 
• Two integers/i,/2 > 1. 
• A cyclic group G = (g) of order n , where g is a generator of G in which 
computing discrete logarithms is infeasible. 
• An element h £ G whose discrete logarithm to base g is unknown. 
The public key for GM is P = (n,e1,e2,fi,f2,Glg,h), and the 
secret key is the factorization of n. 
(ii) Each participant publishes the public key of any digital signature scheme 
and keeps the corresponding secret key. 
Obtaining the Tickets 
(i) A user chooses x ER Z*n to compute y = xei mod n and z = gy. Then, the user 
chooses rx,rzERZ*n to compute y = r^2(jty + / 2 ) mod n, Cx = hr2hy, and 
Q = JR • Then the user sends (y,z, CllC2) along with her signatures which will 
prove the correctness of (y, z.Cx.C^)-
(ii) The GM verifies if the signatures are correct, then she will send the user v — 
yxl^mod n. 
(iii) The user computes v = x>lrxmodn to obtain the ticket (x,v), where 
v = ( / i ^ i + / 2 ) 1 / e z (mod n) 
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Performing the Evaluation 
(i) When a user spends the ith sub-ticket, she computes g = gri, z = gy ,hi = hf, 
Cx = hr2gyand C2 = y^2, where rx,f2 ER Z^ . Then she sends (i,g,z,hi,C1,C2) 
along with her signatures which will prove the correctness of {\.,g,z,hi,Cx,C{) 
are assured to the feedback system's server. 
(ii) The feedback server verifies that the transcript is correctly formed and saves the 
feedback in its database. 
Tracing 
(i) The GM sends the feedback server two transcripts of the feedbacks where the 
same sub-ticket is used and the feedback server verifies that the transcripts are 
correctly formed. If they are correctly formed, the feedback system's server sends 
theGMz = C!/C21/P. 
(ii) The GM searches for z identical to z to present the user's signature on z, which 
indicates the multiple submission of the ticket. 
2.3.6 K-Times Anonymous Authentication Scheme 
K-Times Anonymous Authentication (K-TAA) scheme was first proposed by 
Teranishi, Furukawa, and Sako [3]. This scheme allows members of a group to be 
anonymously authenticated by application providers for a bounded number of times. K-
TAA provides strong anonymity to a user in the sense that no one, not even an authority, 
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can trace the identity of the users, as long as they have been authenticated within the 
allowable K times. K-TAA has applications in e-voting, e-cash, electronic coupons and 
anonymous trial browsing of content. Nguyen and Safavi-Naini [29] proposed dynamic 
k-times anonymous authentication scheme from bilinear paring to enhance the privileges 
of application providers. 
K-TAA scheme should satisfy these basic requirements [3]: 
(i) Anonymity: No one is able to identify the authenticated member, or to decide 
whether two accepted authentication procedures are performed by the same 
member if the authenticated member has followed the authentication procedure 
within the permitted number of times per the GM. 
(ii) Detectability: A public tracing procedure will be executed if a colluding subset of 
members has been authenticated beyond the total number of times each member is 
allowed to be authenticated by the feedback server, 
(iii) Correctness: An honest member will be accepted by the authentication 
procedure performed by the feedback server, 
(iv) Unforgeability: Without the help of GM or members, no colluding group (from 
non-members) can be authenticated as members. 
Compared to blind signature scheme, k-times anonymous authentication scheme 
can provide traceability for any user who tries to authenticate herself (e.g. to cast her 
vote) more than the prescribed limit. 
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K-Times Anonymous Authentication Procedures 
The formal description of this scheme [29] is as follows: 
Setup 
GM randomly chooses 2v-bit rigid integer n (we call n a rigid integer if natural 
number n can be factorized into two safe primes of equal length p1 ,p2), where v is a 
security parameter. 
Let "Zn denotes the ring of natural numbers and natural numbers from 0 to n — 1, 
and QR(ri) be the multiple group of quadratic residues of ln; "Kx denotes a full domain 
hash function onto set X . Then, GM randomly chooses /i-bit string/?GM, where fj. is a 
security parameter, and computes: 
((a',a'o),b) = H2 2xG(RGM) and (a, a0) = (a' ,a'0 )modn G QR(ri)2. 
The group secret key is (p l5 p2) and the group public key is (n, RGM, a, a0l b). 
Joining 
(i) A user ut selects x' Ev A, where A as a set of integers that in (0,2A) and A is a 
security parameter; Uj sends its commitment C to GM with a validity proof to 
show that C is correctly computed from x'. 
(i) The GM verifies the proof, and sends x" Ev A to U[. 
(ii) ui confirms that x" Ev A is satisfied and computes: 
x = ((x' + x") mod 2A) 
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and (a,/?) = (a* modn,bx), and adds new data (£,/?) to the identification 
list LIST. Then, ut sends (a, /?) to the GM with a validity proof, 
(iii) GM verifies (£, /?) is an element of the identification list, and the proof is valid. 
Then, GM generates a prime e Ey T, where T is a set of integers in the range 
(2Y, 2Y + 2A), where y and A are security parameters; then computes A = 
(a cio)1^ mod n, and sends (A, e) to user tt;. 
(iv) Wj confirms that equation ax a0 = Ae mod n is satisfied, e is a prime, and e is an 
element of T. The new member M's secret key is x, and her public key 
is (a, A, e,P). 
Bound Announcement 
The feedback system's server V publishes (IDV, kv ). Here, IDV is her ID. Let: 
(tlt tx) = KGz (IDV, kv, 1), . . . , (tv, iv) = KG2 (IDVl kv, kv) 
We call (tw, iw) the w-th tag base of V. 
Authentication 
(i) A member M increases counter CIDviky. If value w of counter CIDvky is greater 
than kv , then M sends 1 to V and stops, 
(ii) V sends random integer I Ev [0,2^+E] D N to M. 
(iii) M computes tag (x, f) = (t^,, (&J tw)^); using M's secret key x and the w-th tag 
base (tw, iw), computes proof that (T, f) is correctly computed, and sends (x, f) 
and the validity proof to V. 
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(iv) If the proof is valid and if T is different from all search tags in its authentication 
logs, V adds tuple (x, f, I) and the proof to the authentication log LOG of V, and 
outputs accept. 
Public Tracing 
(i) From LOG, one finds two data (T,T, I, PROOF) and (T',t',I', PROOF') that 
satisfy x = T' and I & V , and that PROOF and PROOF' are valid. If one cannot 
find such data, then one outputs NO — ONE. 
(ii) One computes: 
1 
P' = (^7)'-'' = 
and searches pair (t, /?) that satisfies / ? = / ? ' from the identification list. Then, 
one outputs a member's ID i. If there is no such (i,/?), then one affirms that GM 








The Proposed System 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the main design details of our configurable online anonymous 
feedback system are provided. 
Fundamentally, we can identify three types of entities that participate in our 
system, namely the Evaluator (E), who performs the evaluation, Registration Server 
(RS), who signs the evaluation and Evaluation Server (ES), who verifies and saves the 
evaluation forms in its database. 
3.2 Assumptions 
In order to make our design useful, it is essential to verify that the following 
assumptions are satisfied in the implementation setup: 
(i) £"s identity is unique when using our system. 
(ii) We assume that there is a large number of evaluators in the network and some of 
those evaluators are adversaries, who may submit multiple biased feedbacks 
against or for the same party. 
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(iii) We assume the existence of a Mixnet-based anonymous communication system 
[14, 38, 39] so that noone is able to discover the identity-related information, such 
as the £"s IP address even if they have access to the servers log files. 
3.3 System Design 
Our proposed system, in addition to providing anonymity, is designed to be user 
friendly and generic. In other words, it allows the administrator to change the evaluation 
form to fit the assessment of any type of function or performance. Our system design 
comes in two flavors: 
(i) Untraceable online anonymous feedback system based on the RSA blind signature 
scheme [10] in which every registered evaluator is allowed to anonymously cast 
her vote only once and no one will be able to backtrace her; 
(ii) Traceable online anonymous feedback system based on k-times anonymous 
authentication scheme [3] in which, if a malicious evaluator sends multiple 
feedbacks against the same evaluatee, then she can be identified. 
3.3.1 Untraceable Online Anonymous Feedback System 
We designed this scheme to maintain the anonymity of the evaluator even 
against an abusive authority that has access to the evaluation server by employing an 
anonymous authentication mechanism based on RSA blind signature scheme [10] (see 
section 2.3.1). Moreover, in this design the evaluator can never be identified by the 
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adversaries, the Registration Server or the Evaluation Server, even if all of them collude 




When E wants to anonymously submit her Feedback (F) to the ES, she does the 
following (see Figure 3.1): 
(iii) E generates a fresh 128 bit random number EvalNO . 
(iv) E computes: 
HEvaluation = H(F\\EvalNO) 
where H presents the SHA-1 hash value of the evaluation form concatenated 
with EvalNO. 
(v) Generate a random number blinding factor k and perform the blinding 
transformation on HEvaluation to get the blinded message 
"Evaluation ~ "Evaluation- K mod U 
where (n, e) is the public key of RS. Then E sends H'Evaluation to RS. 
(vi) RS signs the received message as: Sig' — (HEvaluation)d mod n and then 
returns the signature to E, where d key is the private of RS 
(vii) E unblinds the received signature Sig by computing 
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Sig — Sig . k — (HEvaluation) . k — (HEvaluation. k ) .k 
— ("Evaluation) -k.k = HEvaiuation mod 71. 
E sends Sig along with the original F and EvalNO to the ES. 
(1) Generates a random 
number EvalNO 
(2) Computes: 
^ Evaluation = H(EF\\EvalNO) 
(3) Generates a random number k 
(4) Blinds the HEvaluation as: 
Msgx =HEpaluation.ke(modn) Msgx 
Msg2 
(1) Verify the authenticity of E. 
(2) Blindly sign Msgt as: 
Msg2 - (H'Evaluation)d(modn) 
(5) Verify the validity of RS's 
signature on Msgz 
Figure 3.1 Messages Exchange between E and RS. 
It is important to note that, the last step in the process above should be 
performed after arbitrarily random interval (with a pre-specified time limit). This is 
necessary in order to prevent the ES from revealing the identity of E by simply observing 
that E was the last entity communicating with RS before it receives Sig. 
Verification 
As shown in Figure 3.2, when ES receives Sig, F and EvalNO from E, she 
performs the following verification process: 
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(6) Unblinds the Msg2 
Msg3 = Msg2.k~1 
= Cht' ^d k'1 
\11Evaluation J • a 
—
 V."Evaluation- K ) • K 
=
 C"Evaluation) • *• & 
~ (^Evaluation) m°d n Msg 
(1) Verify the validity of RS's 
signature on Msg3 as: 
Msg3 = ((WEvaluation) ) 
= :
 HEvaluation(m°d n ) 
(2) Checks non-replication property, 
and then saves the evaluation 
data in the database. 
Figure 3.2 Messages Exchange between E and ES. 
(i) ES Verifies that 
Sig = \,nEVaiuation ) = nEvaiUation mod n 
where (n, e) is the public key of RS. If this verification fails, the 
submitted evaluation will be rejected and discarded, 
(ii) Check if the evaluation database does not have any previous evaluation records 
with the same EvalNO. If any previously received evaluations has the 
same EvalNO, then the current evaluation will be rejected, otherwise it is saved 
in the evaluation database with its corresponding EvalNO. This step is necessary 
to prevent any evaluator from submitting the same feedback multiple times. The 
long length of EvalNO ensures that the probability of having two evaluators 
generating the same EvalNO is practically zero. 
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3.3.2 Traceable Online Anonymous Feedback System 
While this system ensures the anonymity of honest evaluators, malicious 
evaluators who misuse their anonymity and attempt to submit multiple feedbacks against 
the same evaluatee will be identified and their anonymity will be revoked. 
In this section we describe the main procedures of our scheme which is based 
on k-times anonymous authentication scheme [3] (see section 2.3.6). 
The Procedures 
Registration 
Let N and TLn denote the ring of natural numbers from 0 to n - 1, QR(n) be the 
multiplication group of quadratic residues of TLn, A is a security parameter, and A, T are 
sets of integers that were in (0,2A) and (2Y, 2Y + 2A) respectively. 
As shown in Figure 3.3, E can join the evaluation process as follows. 
(i) E selects x' Gv A, and sends a commitment C = gx + hs mod n to RS with 
a validity proof to show that C is correctly computed fromx'. Here 
(g, h) £(/ QR(ri)2 and s' is a random natural number. 
(ii) RS selects x" Eu A and sends it to E. 
(iii) E computes x = (x' + x") mod 2X. 
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(iv) E computes (a,/?) = (ax mod n, bx), where a, b are part of the group public 
key. Next, E adds a new entry (i, /?) to the identification list and sends {a, /?) to 
RS with a validity proof to show that C is correctly computed from x'. 
(v) RS verifies that the proof is valid, and (i, /?) is an element of the identification 
list. If the verification succeeds, RS generates a prime e Gy f, computes A = 
(a a0)1/ /e mod n, where a0 is a part from the group public key, and sends 
04, e) to E. 
(vi) E confirms that equation ax a0 = Ae mod n is satisfied, e is a prime, and e is 
an element of f. The new evaluator £"s secret key is x, and her public key 
is {a,A,e,P). 
Evaluation 
As shown in Figure 3.4, E can perform the evaluation process as follows, 
(i) ES publishes his identity IDES and KES . Here, KES the maximum number of 
evaluations that E can perform. 
Let \Tj,Tj) = K<G,TxGT(IDEvaiuateej,IDES,KES) 
for; = 1,..., KEvaluatee, where /Du,,aiuoteetis the identity of the Evaluatee that 
the evaluation is accusing, and KEvaiuateeis the number of the evaluatees. Here, 
(7), 7)) called the j t h tag base of £5. 
(ii) ES sends random integer I Gy [0, 2^+£] D N to E, where u, s are security 
parameters. 
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(1) Selects x' Ev A. 
(2) Computes a commitment: 




x = (V + x") mod 2A 
(4) Computes: 
(a, /?) = (ax modn,bx) 
(5) Adds (i, /?) to the the 
(a,/?) 
identification list Validity Proof 
04, e) 
(6) Confirms that:ax a0 = ^4e mod n 
is satisfied, then £"s secret key is x, 
and her public key is (a, A, e, /?) 
^ ^ 
(1) Selects x" Ev A. 
* (2) Verifies if the validity proof is 
valid, and (i,/?) is an element of the 
identification list. 
(3) Generates a prime e Ev T 
(4) Computes:^ = (a a0)1/ /e mod n 
Figure 3.3: Messages Exchange between E and RS. 
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(iii) E calculates the tag (F, f ) = (7)*, (blTj)x) using the j t h tag base (7), 7)). 
(iv) £ Fills the Feedback (F). 
(v) Finally, is sends (F, f, F) to ES with validity proof. 
(vi) ES verifies If the proof is valid and if F is different from all search tags in the 





(7) Calculates the tag as: 
(rlr) = (Tjx,(Alfj)x) 
(8) Fills the Feedback (F). (F, F, F) 
Validity Proof 
(1) Publishes his identity IDES and KES 
(2) Lets 
(Tj,Tj) = J£GTXC,TO DEvaiuatee j , IDES, KES) 
forj = 1, —,KEvaiuatee. 
(3) Generates random integer / Gy TL*V 
(4) Verifies If the proof is valid and if F is 
different from all search tags in his 
database. Adds (F, F, /, F) and the proof to 
his database. 
Figure 3.4 Messages Exchange between E and ES. 
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Tracing 
ES can easily identify and trace any malicious evaluator who tries to submit 
multiple evaluations against the same evaluatee for the same reason as follows. 
(i) ES finds two entries (r , f, I, Proof ) and (/", f', /', Proof) that satisfy r - T' 
and I =£ {', and that both Proof and Proof are valid, if no such entry can be 
found, the procedure will not be able to disclose the evaluator identity. 




and searches for a pair (£, /?) in the database which discloses the evaluator 
identity. 




Implementation and Security 
Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we describe the implementation details of our proposed online 
anonymous feedback system. We also provide some informal analysis of its security 
properties. 
Figure 4.1 shows the procedure followed by different system participants. The 
implemented user interface allows the administrator to change the evaluation form to fit 
the assessment of any type of function or performance and makes it available to the users 
via a web browser. 
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4.2 The Architecture Design 
In what follows, we describe the general architecture of our system. As 








Authorization (Role-Based Security) 
Administrator "~ Evaluator Evaluatee ^*" Reviewer 
Create/Modify/Delete 







^ L . 









Choose One Evaluation 
to Review 
iiii 
— — • iBiSsi;! ; 4 — 
Evaluation Server 
Figure 4.1 The procedure followed by different participants 
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Registration Server 
Before being able to perform any actions, users must first be registered with the 
registration server. Registered users can then be authenticated by providing valid login 
information. If a user is authenticated by the registration server, she can perform the 
authorized actions based on her role. Otherwise she will be redirected to the login page. 
Administrator 
The administrator is responsible for the creation, modification or deletion of the 
evaluation forms and the users' accounts. The administrator is also responsible for 
determining the roles of the system participants. 
Evaluator 
An evaluator is a registered user that is allowed to perform the evaluation by 
filling and submitting the evaluation form to the evaluation server. An evaluator may also 
save a draft of her form before her final submission. 
Evaluatee 
An evaluatee is the person whose qualifications and performance are being 




A reviewer is allowed to view the entire evaluation form. In other words, a 
reviewer view is not limited to the summary of the evaluation statistics. For the electronic 
course evaluation application, this role might be assigned to personals from teaching and 
learning centers who may need to further investigate the evaluation statistics. 
Evaluation Server 
The evaluation server is responsible for saving anonymous evaluation forms, and 
producing the evaluation summery. It should be noted that, although the evaluation server 
and registration server are shown in Figure 4.1 as two separate entities, they can be 
implemented on the same server machine. 
4.3 The development Environment 
Our system has been implemented using Microsoft's new Visual Studio .NET 
development environment. The server side is an ASP.NET 2.0 dynamic data drive web 
application written in C#.NET, which is embedded in the HTML pages. The code that 
executes on the server (to process handlers for events such as button click) is also written 
in C#.NET. The client-side code has been implemented with HTML and JavaScript. The 
system utilizes the new membership capabilities of ASP.NET 2.0. In particular, it uses 
role-based security to control access to the website. We also use Microsoft SQL Server 
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2005 for database operations, including the store and retrieval of login information, as 
well as feedback display and submission data. 
In what follows, we briefly summarize some features of these development 
tools. 
Microsoft's Visual Studio .NET is a complete suite of tools for building both 
desktop and team-based enterprise web applications. In addition to building high-
performing desktop applications, it also has a powerful component-based development 
tools and other technologies to simplify team-based design, development, and 
deployment of enterprise solutions. Microsoft .NET includes the following components: 
• .NET Framework: It provides the basic system services that support ASP.NET, as 
well as Windows Forms development. A part of the purpose of the .NET 
framework is to allow for "mobile code" to be distributed to users on multiple 
platforms, security has become a major concern. Mobile code is an application or 
piece of software that is transmitted from a server to a local system (or other 
device) to be executed locally. 
• .NET Enterprise Servers: It provides much of the functionality needed by most 
large businesses. 
• .NET language and Language tools: It allows developers to work with any .NET-
complaint language and take full advantage of advanced language feature. 
ASP.NET is a programming framework built on the common language runtime 
that can be used on a server to build powerful web applications. The first version of 
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ASP.NET offered several important advantages over previous web development models. 
ASP.NET 2.0 improves upon that foundation by adding support for several new and 
exciting features in the areas of developer productivity, administration and management, 
extensibility, and performance. 
Microsoft SQL Server 2005 is Microsoft's enterprise-class database 
management system. It can deal with small databases such as a personal list of contacts. 
It can also handle a very large database. SQL Server 2005 offers some very useful 
features such as input and output of data as XML and integrated OLAP engine. 
4.4 Implementation 
In this section we describe the implementation of the major components of our 
online anonymous feedback system. 
4.4.1 Authentication 
The .NET security model operates in two basic modes: windows authentication 
and forms authentication. Windows authentication uses users' login information, as 
provided when they log into the Windows operating system installed on their local 
machine, to authenticate a user. For web-based system, such as our developed system, the 
forms authentication method seems to be more practical. Forms authentication allows a 
user to log in with a username and password they provide on an HTML form. If valid 
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login information for all users of a system is stored in a SQL Server database, as it is for 
our work, forms authentication can look up a username and password in the database to 
authenticate a user attempting to log into the system. 
4.4.2 Authorization (Role Based Security) 
Authorization can be thought of as folder-based protection. When a user is 
authenticated with forms authentication, their roles are assigned according to their 
identity in the form of an Internet cookie that is used for authorization. A web 
configuration file is used to specify which folders users of specific roles may access. If a 
user is not authenticated (e.g., user has not provided a valid login) or attempts to access a 
folder they are not authorized to access, they are redirected to a web page specified in the 
web configuration file. 
When users log into our system, they specify which account they are logging 
into and provide a username and password. Their username and password are looked up 
in the specified account database's table to authenticate the user. Furthermore, an 
authenticated user's ID is looked up in each of the account database's role tables 
(Administrators, Evaluators, Evaluatees, and Reviewers) to build a list of the user's roles. 
The user's ID is also looked up in the system database's table to determine if the user is 
the account's administrator. All of the user's roles, since users may be members of 
multiple roles, are attached to their identity in the form of a cookie used to authorize them 
on our feedback system web pages. After successfully logging into the system, users are 
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taken to an action page that dynamically presents options to them based on their roles. 
Users who are not authenticated or authorized are redirected to the home page, which is 
also the login page of our system. 
4.4.3 Evaluation 
In order to explain the implemented mechanism which is used to perform the 
online anonymous evaluation, we will describe the main classes and methods (refer to 
Figure 4.4). 
Getting Certificates 
We can package public keys as couples of identity and purpose information 
called a certificate, which give some features such as expiration times, key revocation, 
and key owner information. 
Generally, there are three ways that can be used to request or generate a 
certificate and the corresponding private key: 
• Buy a certificate from companies such as VeriSign and Thawte. 
• Use an internal Certificate Authority (CA) if you already have it on your network. 
This can be done through the Certificates Microsoft Management Console 
(MMC) snap-in or through the web interface of the CA. Certificate Services are 
optional components of Microsoft Windows Server 2003. 
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• For experimental and testing purposes, one can use a self-signed certificate as we 
did in our implementation. The .NET Framework contains a tool called 
Makecert.exe. By using this tool, one can generate certificates, which can be used 
only for test purposes. 
The Certificate and Key Store 
Windows operating system abstracts the physical storage location of private keys 
and certificates by using the notion of stores. Our keys could be stored on the hard disk or 
a smart card or some other storage devices. From the application perspective, we always 
interact with the store and don't care about the implementation details. In our 
implementation, we managed the certificate store by using the MMC snap-in (see Figure 
4.2). 
Windows operating system has two store types: the user store and the machine 
store. The machine store is for certificates that should be available machine-wide (or for 
system accounts), whereas the user store contains only user-specific certificates. For 
services and daemons such as our ASP.NET application, we need to use the machine 
store. Each store is divided into several folders. The most important ones are Personal, 
Other People, and Trusted Root Certification Authorities. The folders have the following 
purposes: 
51 
im Consolel - [Console RootlCertificates - Current UserVTruste... [- | O] X 
°§5J] Fjle fiction Jfiew Favorites Window Help 
(~1 Console Root 
',- j f p Certificates - Current User 
- Q Personal 
£j Certificates 
+' Q Trusted Root Certification Authorities 
+ C ] Enterprise Trust 
+ Q j Intermediate Certification Authorities 
+ LU Active Directory User Object 
+ C3 Trusted Publishers 
+ C j Untrusted Certificates 
+ C l Third-Party Root Certification Authorities 
- CJ Trusted People 
^ BBJHHBBEB 
- d Other People 
O Certificates 
+ C3 Certificate Enrollment Requests 
+ Q.NMSTR 
'. - | S | X J ! 
issued To > 
H5NN 
< •• i > 
Trusted People store contains 1 certificate. 
Figure 4.2 MMC snap-in 
• Personal Certificates in the personal store have an associated private key. This 
key is used for decrypting or digitally signing data. 
• Other People This folder contains the certificates of members to whom we want 
to send encrypted data or for whom we want to verify their digital signatures. 
• Trusted Root Certification Authorities This list holds all certificates of CAs from 
which we want to accept certificates. If we buy a certificate from a well-known 
company such as VeriSign, no special action is necessary because its certificate is 
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already included by default. In our work we generated certificates by using a 
Makecert tool; so, we imported the certificate in this folder manually. 
Accessing the Certificate Store 
The X509Store class enables us to do all store-related operations. We have to 
specify which store (user or machine) and container (Personal, Other People, or Trusted 
Root Certification Authorities) we want to open. We can also search the certificate store by 
using one of the several properties of a certificate (for example, name, issuer, or expiration 
dates) (see Figure 4.3). 
Asymmetric Encryption Using Certificates in .NET 
.NET 2.0 includes a full-featured Application Programming Interface (API) for 
asymmetric cryptography and certificates. The functionality is split into the following 
two namespaces: 
• System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates Contains classes to access the 
certificate store (adding/deleting containers, adding/deleting certificates, and 
searching) and to show the standard Windows certificate dialog boxes. 
• System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs Contains classes that implement the 
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Cryptographic 
Standards (PKCS) algorithms for encryption and digital signatures. 
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Figure 4.3 Properties of a Certificate 
Creating the Evaluation Form 
By using ASP.NET programming framework, we created an evaluation form, 
PreformEvaluation.aspx, to gather evaluator's feedbacks. In this form we developed a C# 
.NET class PreformEvaluation.es to collect some parameters including the evaluatee's 
name, the questions' IDs and the responses. Another C# .NET class, RemotePost.es, is 
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responsible for posting the evaluation form's data and all other relative parameters from 
form to another. 
Submit the Evaluation 
By clicking the submit button on the evaluation form, after filling the evaluation 
questions, the method SubmitBut_Click() in the class PreformEvaluation.es will be 
invoked along with a JavaScript files RSA.js, Hashjsha.js and Keygenerator.js to 
generate a random numbers and hash the evaluation form data on the client side. Then a 
C# .NET class CryptoFunctions.es is also invoked to encrypt, decrypt and sign the 
evaluation data by using some methods developed in it such as Encrypt(), DecryptQ, 
SignAndEncryptQ, DecryptAndVerifyQ and GetCertificateQ. Finally, a C# .NET class 
FeedBackSystemDB.es will be invoke. This class is responsible for storing the evaluation 
data on the evaluation server's database. 
Evaluation summary Review 
ReviewEvaluationSummary.aspx is an ASP.NET form developed to be used by 
the Evaluator and the Evaluatee to view the evaluation summary after submitting the 
evaluation form. In this form, we developed a C# .NET class 
ReviewEvaluationSummary.es to retrieve some parameters from the evaluation server's 
database and show it back to the evaluator as a summary. The main method in this class 
is a SubmitBut_Click() which is invoked by clicking the submit button on the evaluation 
summary form. 
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ReviewEntitrEvaluations.aspx is an ASP.NET form developed to be used by the 
Reviewer to view the entire evaluations after all evaluators have submitted their 
evaluation forms. In this form, we developed a C# .NET class 
ReviewEntitrEvaluations.es to retrieve all parameters from the database and show it back 
to the Reviewers. The main method in this class is a SubmitBut_Click() which is invoked 
by clicking the submit button on the review entire evaluation forms. 
Modifying the Evaluation Form 
ModifyEvaluationForm.aspx is an ASP.NET form developed to be used by the 
Administrator to modify the evaluation form to fit the assessment of essentially any type 
of function or performance. In this form we developed a C# .NET class 
ModifyEvaluationForm.es to retrieve parameters such as QuestionID and QuestionType. 
The main method in this class is a SubmitBut_Click() which is invoked by clicking the 
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Figure 4.4 Class Diagram of the Online Anonymous Feedback System 
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4.5 Interaction Scenario 
The following interaction scenario, illustrated with some screenshots, give a 
clear view about how our system works and explain the major functions of the developed 
system. 
Before making any action, a user must be registered in the Registration Server by 
the Administrator to become a system member whom we call an Evaluator. Now, this 
Evaluator will be allowed to log in the system with her username and password. If the 
Evaluator is authenticated by the system, .NET examines the web.config file in the 
application's directory for authorization policies. .NET examines each preceding 
directory up to the virtual root of the Web directory, and appends any additional 
authorization rules to the list. Finally, rules residing in the machine, config file are 
appended to the list. .NET determines access to the specified resource by iterating 
through the rules in the order in which they were read and allows or denies the request 
based on the first rule that matches the authenticated member. If the member is not 
authenticated, that means she does not provide a valid login or she attempts to gain access 
to folders or actions that are not authorized to access. In this case, she will be redirected 
to the login page. A sample login form is shown below in Figure 4.5. 
When a member successfully log into the system, she is taken to a page that 
dynamically presents the possible actions based on her role. That means she may have 
one of these different roles: Administrator, Evaluator, Evaluatee or Reviewer (refer to 
section 4.2 for more details). 
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Figure 4.5 The Login Page 
Suppose that a member successfully log in as an Evaluator. As shown in Figure 
4.6, the Evaluator will, dynamically, be presented with the list of courses that are 
available for evaluation and she will be able to select one of the courses and proceed to 
the next step. The Administrators are responsible for specifying which members may 
evaluate certain courses. 
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Figure 4.6 Sample of the Course Selection Page 
After the Evaluator selects one of her available courses, as shown in Figure 4.6, 
she is be taken to a page that dynamically presents the evaluation form as shown in 
Figure 4.7. Then the Evaluator has to fill up the Evaluation Form by answering all the 
mandatory questions, and submitting it to the Evaluation Server. Note that the Evaluator 
will not be able to reevaluate the same course in the future since the Evaluation Server 
can easily identify and reject these multiple submissions. 
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4.6 Security Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the security of our system and show that our system 
satisfies its design goals. 
Anonymity 
In the registration server side, the submitted hash value of the evaluation form is 
blinded in this form: 
"Evaluation = "Evaluation- * WOu n 
where (n, e) is the public key of RS. Then E sends H'Evaluation to RS. 
Hence the registration server cannot gain any information that it can use later to 
link the contents of the evaluation form to the evaluator. Moreover, it cannot link the 
evaluator to its unblinded evaluation form. Also, only registered users are allowed to 
obtain the registration server blinded signature on their evaluations. 
Vehfiability 
The evaluation server can verify the submitted evaluations from the evaluator 
by checking the validity of registration server's signature in the form of 
Sig = {pEvaluation J = "Evaluation ™od n 
where (n, e) is the public key of the registration server. 
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Unforgeability 
In our system, only registered evaluators can submit valid feedbacks, as each 
feedback is signed by the registration server's private key. No one else can forge a valid 
feedback without registration unless she can break the public key cryptosystem to get the 
private keys of the registration server. 
Non-Replication 
In the proposed system, if any evaluator sends multiple evaluations for the same 
evaluatee, the submitted form will be rejected because each evaluator has a unique 
evaluator number which is totally random number generated on the client side. Then 
when we compare the result of the formula HEvaiuation = H(F\ \EvalNO) with the saved 
hashed forms in evaluation server's database, we will be able to find out whether this 
evaluation has been submitted before or not. By maintaining a simple record of users that 
have previously requested the registration server signature, no user will be allowed to 
perform this step more than once. The evaluation server accepts only evaluations that are 
signed by the registration server and the unregistered users cannot submit any feedback. 
Also the last verification step performed by the evaluation server ensures the registered 
users cannot submit their evaluation multiple times. For example, in a Sybil attack [25], 
malicious users can assume multiple identities, and thus can control a substantial part of 
the system. If such an attack is possible, it would undermine the basis of trust schemes for 
feedback systems, i.e., most Evaluators are honest and each evaluator can give her 
feedback only once when assessing a given Evaluatee. According to [25], without a 
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logically centralized authority, Sybil attacks are always possible except under certain 
assumptions regarding the resources possessed by the attacker. A straightforward solution 
for our system is to let the registration server assume the responsibility of the centralized 
authority. More specifically, during the registration procedure, the registration server is 
responsible for binding the user registering as a member to a real-world identity, and for 
limiting the number of the registrations Evaluator identity to one. 
Accountability 
It should be noted that, the registration server signs a blinded copy of the 
evaluation form and hence even if the authority running this server was biased, it cannot 
filter out any feedbacks based on its contents. The registration server signature on the 
evaluation, which in this form: 
Sig = (HEvaluation)* mod n 
where d is the private key of the registration server, can be considered as evidence that 
can be used to challenge the registration server if the evaluation server refuses to 
accept/post the feedback of the evaluator. 
Traceability 
In our system that is based on the K-Times Anonymous Authentication (K-
TAA) scheme, if an adversary sends multiple evaluations, she will be identified by the 





Here /?' is representing the identity of the malicious evaluator. Moreover, to 
successfully disclose an adversary misusing evaluator's anonymity, the evaluation server 
needs to find a valid record of this adversary, i.e., the identification list item containing 
the identity and public key of that adversary. 




Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, we provide a summary of the main features of our developed 
system. We also point out some future enhancements that can be applied to our system. 
Throughout this work, we designed and implemented an online anonymous 
feedback system by employing an anonymous authentication mechanism. Our system is 
characterized with the following features: 
• The evaluator's anonymity is ensured even against an abusive authority that has 
access to both the evaluation and registration servers. 
• Only registered evaluators can submit valid anonymous feedbacks. 
• Every registered user is allowed to cast her vote only once. 
• If an adversary sends multiple claims against a user for the same reason, she will 
be identified. 
• The authority, responsible for the evaluation process, can be held accountable if 
it blocks any user's feedback. 
• The developed system is generic enough, user friendly and allows the 
administrator to change the evaluation form to fit the assessment of essentially 
any type of function or performance. 
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Future Work 
Several extensions are envisaged for this work. Among them are the following: 
• IP traceback is the ability to trace IP packets to their origins; for that reason, 
preventing IP address traceback is a significant step towards anonymous 
communication systems in which no one is able to discover identity-related 
information. The system developed in this thesis assumes the existence of a 
Mixnet-based anonymous communication system as one solution to this problem. 
Solutions based on the current available network infrastructure require further 
investigation. 
• By correlating information found in the registration and the evaluation servers 
logs files, an abusive authority might be able to identify the identity of some 
evaluators since the time of signing a feedback by the registration server and the 
evaluation form submission time are likely to be close to each other. This problem 
may partially be solved by adding a random delay between receiving the signed 
form from the registration server and submitting it to the evaluation server. 
However, different practical implications need to be considered. 
• We only provided a heuristic argument about the security of the proposed system. 
A more formal analysis of the proposed protocol would give us a better assurance 
of its security properties. 
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• Investigating the possible correlation between assuring the users about their 
anonymity and possible changes in their feedback is an interesting 
multidisciplinary research problem. 
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